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Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Effective But Not Enforceable
Environmentalists have seldom had much time for financiers. So wel-
come a new understanding between the brown-sandalled nature lovers
and the black-Guccied bankers.'
I. INTRODUCTION
i n an attempt to alleviate their severe debt problems several Latin
American countries are proposing increasingly bold and creative plans.
Among these proposals are a debt-for-archeological line drawings plan,2
a debt-for-drugs plan,3 a debt-for-exports plan,4 and a debt-for-tourism
plan.5 The most successful of these innovative plans has been the debt-
for-nature swap.6
Debt-for-nature swaps have been established as a mechanism
through which conservation parks and sustainable use7 areas are set aside
I Greensback Debt, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 1988, at 62.
2 Debt from Outer Space, VI INT'L FIN. L. REv., Nov. 1987, at 1-2. Peru has come up with a
plan to swap a portion of its national debt for the promise to conserve archaeological line drawings
at Nasca in the Peruvian desert.
3 Debt for Drugs Swap, VI INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1987, at 1-2. Bolivia has agreed to help
decrease cocaine export trafficking in exchange for the opportunity to buy back some of its debt at a
discount from creditor banks.
4 Jones, Fishmeal? That'llDo Nicely, EUROMONEY, June 1988 at 149. Peru has entered into an
agreement with First Interstate Trading, the trading company of First Interstate Bank of California,
whereby an inventory of products is sold to the trading company which then sells them in U.S.
markets. According to the senior vice-president of First Interstate Bank, "[o]n [the] selling [of]
certain products we may recoup as much as 40 cents in [sic] the dollar." Id. See also Glen, Debt
Ball In Private Sectors Court: Crisis Provides Fertile Ground for New Solutions, AM. BANKER, Sept.
25, 1987 at 11.
5 Jones, supra note 4. American Express's commercial bank, through its travel agency net-
work, will export travel packages to Peru. The agreement covers a period of "two years during
which time $10 million in unilateral debt will be retired." Id.
6 Giaimo, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative-Global Ecological Disaster, 18
ENVTL. L. 537 (1988); Debt-for-nature swaps have gained the attention of most debt ridden third
world countries. The first swap, which was facilitated in Bolivia, has served as a model for successful
arrangements in Ecuador, Costa Rica, Madagascar, the Philippines, Zambia, Peru, Mexico, and
Tanzania among others. Id. at 565. See Beebe & Stroh, Using Debt to Save Nature, N.Y. Times,
July 28, 1987, at A23, col. I; Passell, Saving the Forest in Costa Rica, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1989, at
D2, col. 1; Tye, Winning One for the Forest, Boston Globe, Apr. 10, 1989, at 13, col. I.
7 Sustainable use areas are development areas modeled after the structure of the natural forest
that is characteristic of the region that will be developed. See Gerstin, Africa's Rainforests Part I£"
TraditionalAgriculture and Modern Problems, WORLD RAINFOREST REPORT, Sept.-Nov. 1988 at 4.
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and legally protected by a foreign government in exchange for cancella-
tion of a portion of that country's foreign debt. Although debt-for-na-
ture swaps are a far cry from being the answer to the international debt
crisis, they do serve several useful purposes.
The most obvious purpose, the conservation and sustainable man-
agement of a biosphere reserve,8 is the motivating force for the environ-
mental groups9 which endorse and coordinate these ventures. In
addition, countries entering into these agreements benefit from a reduc-
tion in the total amount of debt that they owe while the banks benefit by
selling, at a discount rate, loans that could remain in their portfolios
indefinitely.
This Note will examine the development and success of the debt-for-
nature swap in Bolivia, since Bolivia was the first country to enter into
such a pioneering endeavor combining debt relief with environmental
concerns. It will also discuss debt servicing and the debt-for-nature swap
as an alternative debt relief program. Finally, this Note will comment on
the lack of enforcement alternatives in the Bolivian debt-for-nature swap
agreement concluding that this is merely an omission that should not,
and most likely will not, jeopardize the utilization of the debt-for-nature
swap as an alternative debt relief program.
II. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP
Bolivia has the distinguished honor of being the first country to sign
Rainforests are very complex and diverse ecosystems which contain countless species of plants and
animals.
In traditional European and North American forests the soil contains the nutrients that support
the crops or forests. The soil in a rainforest, however, is usually poor in nutrients and very thin. In
fact, most of the nutrients that support the complex and diverse species of the rainforest are stored in
the trees themselves. Id.
"Northern agriculture... typically involves eliminating trees and monocropping large fields.
In the tropics, this destroys the nutrient base ... [and] the natural diversity, and exposes large plots
of ground to erosion." Id.
Since traditional Northern farming methods are not suitable to rainforests, a farming method
modeled after the natural forest, known as agroforestry, was developed. Id. Agroforestry has proven
to be an effective method of farming in cost, output and long-term land use terms. Id.
8 A "biosphere reserve" is a naturally protected area set aside or secured by an administrative
decree that "preserves scarce resources while promoting economic growth." Conservation Interna-
tional Fact Sheet, Bolivia's Beni Biosphere Reserve (1987) (on file at the Washington D.C. Conserva-
tion International office) [hereinafter Bolivia's Beni Biosphere Reserve]. See also Allman, The
Preservation Paradox, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 25, 1988, at 53.
9 The environmental groups coordinating these debt-for-nature swaps include: Conservation
International, the World Wildlife Fund and The Nature Conservancy, all located in Washington
D.C.. Some of the active groups that endorse the debt-for-nature swaps include: Rainforest Action
Network (San Francisco, CA), Cultural Survival, Greenpeace USA (New York, N.Y.), Earth Island
Institute (San Francisco, CA), the Environmental Defense Fund (Washington D.C.), the Frank
Weeden Foundation and the National Wildlife Foundation.
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a debt-for-nature swap agreement "creat[ing] conservation areas totaling
more than four million acres in exchange for reduction of part of its for-
eign debt.""0
Conservation International, 1 a non-profit organization, facilitated
this debt-for-nature swap by using a $100,000 grant from the Frank Wee-
den Foundation' 2 to purchase $650,000 of deeply discounted Bolivian
debt from a Swiss bank'3 through Citibank Investment Bank, its agent in
the debt market.14 In exchange for the $650,000 face value debt from
Conservation International, "the Bolivian government [has] agreed to es-
tablish three conservation and sustainable use areas totaling 3.7 million
acres, adjacent to the existing Beni Biosphere Reserve."' 5 The three new
conservation and development areas and the existing 334,000 acres1 6 of
the Beni Biosphere Reserve will cover over 4 million acres of land.
The Beni Biosphere Reserve is the core of the conservation area'
7
consisting of a forest filled with diverse flora and fauna which "supports
13 of Bolivia's 18 endangered animal species, including primates, spotted
cats, deer (including the endangered marsh deer), wild boar, river otter,
foxes, anteaters and bats, as well as birds, amphibians, and reptiles."1 "
The Chimane Forest Reserve is one of the three conservation and buffer
zones that will surround the Beni Biosphere Reserve. 9 It will remain
open to sustained development by the local populations, such as the
Chimane Indians.2° This area is intended to be a 2,870,561 acre buffer
zone to the Beni Biosphere Reserve2 ' where logging, fishing and hunting
10 Conservation International News, Bolivia Sets Precedent with First Ever "Debt for Nature"
Swap 1 (July 13, 1987) [hereinafter CI Press Release]. See also Beebe & Stroh, supra note 6.
II Conservation International is a non-profit organization in Washington D.C. It is advised
"by a board of directors of prominent leaders from throughout the Americas and staffed by the
largest group of Latin American conservation professionals of any U.S. organization." Conservation
International has a unique strategy of addressing forest destruction at both the local and national
levels. News from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The John D. and Cathe-
rine T. MacArthur Foundation Awards $2.3 Million to Conservation International 2-3 (Aug. 18,
1988).
12 The Frank Weeden Foundation is a charitable organization in California that donates exclu-
sively to environmental causes. Chandler, A Debt Swap of a Different Nature for Bolivia: Conserva-
tionists to Retire Some of the Nation's Loans in Exchange for a Vow on Rain Forest [sic], Wash. Post,
July 14, 1987, at E3, col. 1.
13 Id.; Truell, What Some Monkeys in Bolivia Have to Do With the Debt Crisis, Wall St. J., Jan.
20, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
14 CI Press Release, supra note 10.
15 Id. at 2. The Beni Biosphere Reserve is located in northeast Bolivia. Bolivia's Beni Bio-
sphere Reserve, supra note 8.
16 Bolivia's Beni Biosphere Reserve, supra note 8.
17 Allman, supra note 8, at 54.
18 Bolivia's Beni Biosphere Reserve, supra note 8.
19 Id.; Allman, supra note 8, at 54.
20 Bolivia's Beni Biosphere Reserve, supra note 8; Beebe & Stroh, supra note 6.
21 Bolivia's Beni Biosphere Reserve, supra note 8; Beebe & Stroh, supra note 6.
1990]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
by the local Indians is permitted.22 In addition, the Yacuma Regional
Park and CORDEBENI Hydrological Basin, which border the Beni Bio-
sphere Reserve, will become protected conservation areas23 and buffer
zones. These conservation areas cover a total of 877,205 acres24 and sup-
port several endangered plant and animal species. More specifically,
the CORDEBENI Hydrological Basin, a watershed area, is protected
from logging that would lead to erosion of the river basin.2 6
During the implementation process, the Bolivian government estab-
lished a $250,000 fund in local currency to help administer the reserve
areas. 27 This fund is indicative of the acceptance of this program by the
government and people of Bolivia and as a form of commitment to the
project. Further support for the program was shown when the local resi-
dents voted at a Congress of Civic Associations to give seven percent of
their tax revenues from forestry activities to support the biosphere
reserve.
28
Local support and involvement may be the key to success of this
program due to the fact that this land remains under the protected status
of the Bolivian government.29 If this program were simply a passing
whim without local support it would probably not survive. Therefore, it
is extremely important that all parties, especially the local parties, be
committed to this program to insure its success.
Recognizing the important role of Conservation International in fa-
cilitating this program, Bolivia designated Conservation International
the official advisor "in the design and planning of these protected areas,
as well as wildlife management." 3° In this capacity Conservation Inter-
national can help Bolivia implement an environmentally sound conserva-
tion program by bringing their expertise to the planning, development
and implementation stages of the project. In addition, Conservation In-
ternational will be able to evaluate and offer constructive criticism of the
program once it has been established. Bolivia, having little or no experi-
ence in the area of conservation, will benefit greatly from the guidance
Conservation International can provide as their official advisor.
In an effort to strengthen the protection of this area, the Bolivian
22 Allman, supra note 8, at 54.
23 Bolivia's Beni Biosphere Reserve, supra note 8.
24 Id.
25 CI Press Release, supra note 10, at 2.
26 Allman, supra note 8.
27 Truell, supra note 13.
28 Borrelli, Debt or Equity?, AMICUs J. 42-43 (1988).
29 Convenio Entre el Gobierno de Bolivia y Conservation International, July 3, 1987, Bolivia-
Conservation International, at cls. 4, 9 [hereinafter Agreement].
30 Statement by Peter Seligman, Executive Director of Conservation International, Delivered
at the Embassy of Bolivia, Conservation International Press Release 4 (July 13, 1987) [hereinafter CI
Embassy Statement].
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government granted Congressional Law status,3 the highest legal protec-
tion status in Bolivia, to the entire area. This protection is implemented
through a legislative decree32 entered into by the executive representa-
tive,33 and ratified by the Bolivian Congress.34
Despite the useful purposes and good intentions of the facilitating
institution, Conservation International, and the country, Bolivia, the
problem of enforcing debt-for-nature agreements remains unsettled. In
the Bolivian situation specifically, how can Conservation International,
as a private non-profit organization, enforce the continued use of this
conservation area in a manner consistent with the purposes set out in the
agreement?
Arguably, Bolivia, in contemplating and implementing this agree-
ment recognized that this sort of long-term development and conserva-
tion plan would help strengthen the Bolivian economy. In fact, a debt-
for-nature swap is a sounder plan than the traditional, and ecologically
devastating, short-term economic development projects such as the
"slash and burn"3 forest clearing tactics which lead to soil erosion. But,
if a country, such as Bolivia, looses sight of the benefits of the long-term
development and conservation program as a result of a governmental
policy or public opposition, would an organization, such as Conservation
International, be able to enforce the agreement?
III. DEVELOPMENT OF DEBT SERVICING
Formulating a public development policy that fosters long-term
growth in a developing country is not an easy task, nor is it one in which
success is guaranteed. In the past, these plans have ranged from well
thought out long-term development projects, including recent efforts by
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("World
Bank") aimed at developing the private sectors in third world coun-
tries, 36 to short-term, high-yield projects which ultimately destroy the
land and the indigenous inhabitants and their cultural environment.
Before addressing the enforcement aspect of debt-for-nature swaps,
it is necessary to examine how the debt and environmental crisis is com-
31 Bolivia's Beni Biosphere Reserve, supra note 8.
32 Borrelli, supra note 28, at 42.
33 BOL. CONST. arts. 85-98, reprinted in II A..BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 32-35 (1988). In this case the United States Ambassador was
designated by the President of Bolivia to enter into the agreement on behalf of Bolivia. Agreement,
supra note 29, at cls. 6.
34 BOL. CONST., supra note 33, art. 59, at 24-26.
35 "Slash and burn" policies are designed to clear the land for cattle ranches by cutting and
selling the trees -slashing- and burning the stumps and vines that remain instead of manually remov-
ing them.
36 1988 THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 42 [hereinafter WORLD BANK AR].
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pounded by organizations that were created to alleviate the economic
pressures on developing nations.
The World Bank is an example of one organization created to aid
the restoration efforts of the post World War II period.3 7 Over the years
the World Bank has assumed a direct role in the developmental efforts of
third world countries. As international development institutions, the
World Bank and other multilateral development banks ("MDBs")3  are
in a strong position to influence international environmental policies. In
fact, many of the MDBs have in fact adopted formal environmental poli-
cies.3 9 However, there is significant evidence that these are paper policies
that are never, or rarely, incorporated into the projects themselves.'
This evidence includes several notable factors, particularly that ne-
gotiations concerning these issues are usually conducted in private ses-
sions or "behind closed doors."41 For example, the World Bank has a
formalized six-step process, called the Project Cycle which provides a
format and formula for the World Bank to calculate the costs and evalu-
ate the feasibility and success of proposed projects.42 The six steps of the
Project Cycle include: 1) Identification Phase,4 3 2) Preparation Phase,'-
37 Members of the United States government created a draft proposal for an international bank
that would "facilitate the provision of capital for reconstruction ...as well as for development
purposes." E.S. MASON & R.E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETrON WOODS 13 (1973).
This draft proposal resulted in the formation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment. See ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT, as amended effective December 17, 1965 [hereinafter IBRD ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT].
38 Multilateral Development Banks are institutions which lend almost all of their money to
governments and government agencies for development projects. SIERRA CLUB, BANKROLLING DI-
SASTERS: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 11 (1986).
The World Bank is the largest MDB but other MDBs such as the Inter-American Development
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank lend significant amounts of
money to less developed countries for development projects. Id.
39 Id. at 4.
40 See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
41 SIERRA CLUB, supra note 38, at 4.
42 W. BAUM, THE PROJECT CYCLE 3 (1982).
43 In this phase the World Bank selects projects that are of high priority and compatible with
the criteria and purposes of the World Bank. At the outset the World Bank depended on govern-
ments or private individuals to bring these projects to their attention. Id. at 6. Recently, however,
the World Bank has identified projects through Identification Missions which are sent to the poten-
tial borrowing countries to assess the feasibility of the project. Id. The feasibility test is the prima
facie test for approval of the project. D. BAHL, THE WORLD BANK & INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
CORPORATION 36 (1986). Sometimes these missions are able to spot areas that are ripe for a World
Bank development project and will recommend their findings to the Executive Directors. W. BAUM,
supra note 42, at 21. After meeting the feasibility test the World Bank and the borrowing govern-
ment turn to establishing the methods and conditions of turning the project into a reality.
44 At this point the World Bank and the borrowing government collaborate to produce a de-
tailed description of what the project objectives are, how these objectives will be implemented, (i.e.
what means will be utilized) and what terms and conditions the supervision and financing of the
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DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
3) Appraisal Phase,45 4) Negotiations Phase,46 5) Implementation
Phase 7 and 6) Supervision Phase.4 Recently, the World Bank added a
seventh phase, the Evaluation Phase.4 9 Here a detailed post-project eval-
uation is done in an effort to facilitate a comparison with the results of
project will be subject to. W. BAUM, supra note 42, at 8-10. The World Bank plays a very active
part in this area, despite the fact that it wishes to maintain a distinction between its role as an advisor
and as the financial backer and not the borrower or grantor of funds. Id. However, with the exper-
tise that the World Bank and their representatives can bring to the development project discussions
concerning technical, operational and financial operations, it is in the best interests of the borrowing
country and the World Bank to share this information before the proposal is finalized.
45 As the proposal is finalized the project is scheduled for the Appraisal Phase. An appraisal is
an independent review conducted by the staff of the World Bank "cover[ing] the four major aspects
of the project-technical, institutional, economic, and financial." Id. at 11.
The technical review determines whether the project plan utilizes the most efficient or appropri-
ate engineering methods. In addition, the cost estimates, machinery requisitions, utility factors, and
the impact on the environment and local people are considered in terms of the realistic expectations
of the project and the needs of that area of the country. Id. at 11-12; D. BAHL, supra note 43, at 36-
37.
The institutional review is designed to examine the potential borrower and its managerial and
organizational structures. W. BAUM, supra note 42, at 12. In doing this the World Bank must take
into account the political state of affairs of the country that may or may not influence the project. D.
BAHL, supra note 43, at 37.
The financial review is designed to ensure that sufficient funds are available to implement the
project, that the borrowing government has the resources or means of acquiring the resources to
repay its obligation, and that the project costs are realistic. Id. at 36-38.
Finally, the economic review analyzes the costs and benefits of the project, the alternative meth-
ods of implementing the project, and how the project meets the needs of the country. W. BAUM,
supra note 42, at 13-15. At this stage the project must show an economic return for the country and
the World Bank or risk being rejected. Id. After all the reviews are conducted, they are put into a
"report that sets forth its findings and recommends terms and conditions of the loan." Id. at 17.
This report, after being reviewed and redrafted, is then presented to the Executive Directors for
approval. The Executive Directors rarely reject the proposal due to the World Bank's extensive
involvement throughout the process. Id.
46 The Negotiations phase is the stage at which the World Bank and the borrower transform
the report and terms of the agreement into legal obligations. "The agreement usually contains a
schedule of implementation and covenants on such matters as anticipated rates of return, revenue
levels, organizational changes and land acquisition." D. BAHL, supra note 43, at 38. When the
negotiations are complete the "appraisal report,.., the President's report and the loan documents
[are] presented to the Bank's Executive Directors." W. BAUM, supra note 42, at 18. Upon approval
from the Executive Directors the loan is signed, signaling the first act commencing the project.
47 Subject to the terms of the loan agreement the World Bank assists at this stage as is neces-
sary but the primary burden of implementation rests on the borrower. W. BAUM, supra note 42, at
19. The World Bank remains involved in the project through the companion phase of Supervision.
However, by supervising the implementation of the project an on-site evaluation can be compiled to
identify the strong points and the defects in the proposal. Id. at 19-24.
48 Id. at 20-21.
49 The need and value of a more structured evaluation system was recognized and "[i]n 1970,
an Evaluation phase was established as the final stage in the project cycle. Id. at 22. The information
learned in the field through hands-on experience was invaluable; therefore, it was necessary to devise
a way to document and reference the findings. In addition, the Operations Evaluation staff, a staff
group that reports directly to the Executive Directors, was commissioned.
1990]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
the pre-implementation work done by the World Bank staff.5 °
Phase Four of the Project Cycle, the Negotiations Phase, is de-
scribed as a phase that includes open negotiation tactics. In reality, the
negotiations are between the borrowing governments, their designated
representatives, and the World Bank and rarely include input from the
indigenous peoples or members of the communities who are designated
as the "intended beneficiaries"'" of these projects.
Further evidence of this paper policy is evident in the cost calcula-
tions which rarely take into account "externalities" such as the costs to
the environment through the use of pesticides and the impact of defores-
tation and pollution.5 2 These types of cost calculations are not built into
the World Bank's "economic rate of return"53 formula as it is set out in
the Appraisal Phase of the Project Cycle. In fact, it is reported that the
"economic rate of return" formula is nebulous, flexible, and frequently
adapted to the needs of the proposal, regardless of the cost to the envi-
ronment or the harm to the inhabitants.54 This suggests that the World
Bank "paper policy" is even further removed from being incorporated
into the proposal than previously suggested.
Further evidence of this being a "paper policy" is that the World
Bank, as an international development institution similar to most MDBs,
is not appropriately staffed to handle environmental concerns.55 In 1986
the World Bank Office of Environmental and Scientific Affairs had four
staff members, only one of which was an ecologist.5 6 The environmental
evaluations necessary for an informed proposal cannot be appropriately
handled by the limited staff resources made available for such purposes.
Over the past few years, increasing pressure from environmental
groups, the Reagan Administration, and Members of the United States
Congress have forced the World Bank to address the environmental void
in their project proposals.57 In response to this pressure, the World Bank
instituted a reorganization plan in 1987 that increased the emphasis
given to environmental concerns. 58 As a result of the reorganization
"[e]nvironmental units were established in all four regional offices, 59
[and] a central environment department was set up in the senior vice-
50 Id. at 22.
51 See generally W. BAUM, supra note 42, at 1-24.
52 SIERRA CLUB, supra note 38, at 14.
53 W. BAUM, supra note 42, at 11.
54 SIERRA CLUB, supra note 38, at 13-14.
55 Dumanski, A New Run on the World Bank's Policies, Boston Globe, Oct. 5, 1986 at A25, col.
1.
56 Id.
57 Shabecoff, World Lenders Facing Pressure From Ecologists Activists Urge Banks to Halt
Harmful Projects, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
58 WORLD BANK AR, supra note 36, at 42-44.
59 These environmental units, which are part of the Operations Staff, consist of five environ-
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presidency for policy, planning, and research." 60
The World Bank stated that this reorganization translated into two
basic premises: "[F]irst, to expand its efforts to address the environmen-
tal consequences of individual projects specifically aimed at environmen-
tal problems; and second, to stress the development of policy
interventions designed to influence environmentally related behavior on a
large scale." 61
In addition to the groups and parties previously mentioned, these
policy changes were influenced by the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development ("Brundtland Commission") 6 by way of their
report entitled, Our Common Future.63 The Report emphasized that en-
vironmental policies should be fully and naturally integrated into the de-
velopment and project planning stages by both development institutions
and the countries seeking the implementation of the project.' Moreover,
the Brundtland Commission recommended focusing more on long-term
effects rather than short-term profits.65
As a result of the Brundtland Commission's report "special atten-
tion is [also] being paid to the severe environmental problems in sub-
Saharan Africa (such as desertification and salinity),.. . and to regional
problems such as the pollution of the Mediterranean Sea.",66 More spe-
cifically, efforts are being made through the Operations Evaluation Staff
of the World Bank, which reports directly to the Executive Directors, to
evaluate past projects to try to define patterns, positive or negative, link-
ing projects to each other.67 This differs from the regular evaluations
process in that it will be a cumulative evaluation rather than the single
project evaluation that was previously mentioned.68 Moreover, these
evaluations will focus on environmental issues.69
The combination of cumulating environmental trends in project
evaluations and presenting the results directly to the Executive Directors,
mental professionals for each of the four operational regions - Latin America, Africa, Asia and
Europe/Middle East. Id.
60 Id. at 43.
61 Id.
62 "The commission, chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, prime minister of Norway, was es-
tablished by the United Nations in 1983 to propose measures to address long-term environmental
concerns." WORLD BANK AR, supra note 36, at 43 n.7 and accompanying text at 43-44.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 43, 103.
67 Id. at 44.
68 Cumulating the results of these evaluations will allow the World Bank to highlight the posi-
tive and negative factors of these projects and ultimately operate more efficiently by changing ineffec-
tive programs and modeling effective ones.
69 Id.
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as the Operations Evaluation staff is commissioned to do, may increase
the Executive awareness in the World Bank of the need to pursue envi-
ronmentally sound developmental policies."v
Despite the fact that the World Bank had a six-stepv" Project Cycle
plan and a paper plan on environmental protection, the development pro-
grams that have been implemented in recent years indicate that less than
prudent judgment was exercised with regard to foreseeing the impact of
these programs on the land and people of the countries they involve.
72
The high yield 3 projects, which lack thorough planning, have come
back to haunt the World Bank in the form of failing projects, increased
loan programs, destitute people and useless land. 4 Neither the World
Bank nor the world in general can afford the continuation of this cavalier
attitude toward environmental protection.
If appearances mean anything, then the 1987 Reorganization Plan
and its inclusive changes in the World Bank's environmental policies
seem to be more than just another paper policy.7 The World Bank has
increased the size of their environmental units7 6 and appears to be cogni-
zant of the environmental concerns that directly affect their development
projects.7 The key is to direct the projects in an environmentally sound
manner; awareness and planning are the beginning stages of this process.
As noted, designing developmental policies is not an easy task. But
the World Bank, as one of the largest development institutions, has an
obligation to the countries and people they deal with, the world at large
and itself to: 1) incorporate an examination of the impact of their pro-
posed projects on the environment and indigenous people; and 2) direct
their public development loan policies in a way that fosters environmen-
70 W. BAUM, supra note 42, at 21. See also IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 37,
§ 4, § 19. This is possible because these reports do not go through the traditional red-tape associated
with these types of evaluation programs. The people making the decisions concerning the daily
operations of the programs, the Executive Directors, are the ones receiving the reports.
71 With the addition of the Evaluations Phase the program has seven steps. However, this
phase has not been formally added to the Project Cycle program, therefore, the Project Cycle only
has six formal steps or phases.
72 See generally Dumanski, supra note 55; World Bank- Accounting for the Environment, THE
ECONOMIST (June 21, 1986). These articles discuss the following failed World Bank projects: Polo-
noreste project in Brazil; Narmada Dam project in India; Transmigration project in Indonesia; and
Cattle-ranching project in Botswana.
73 "High Yield" projects are development projects that are designed to produce a high rate of
return on the initial investment. They may be less sound than other programs and are usually short-
term projects due to the fact that the natural resources they depend on are depleted faster that they
can regenerate. Examples of these projects include the Polonoreste, Narmada Dam, Transmigra-
tion, and Cattle-Ranching projects mentioned in Dumanski, supra note 55.
74 Id.
75 See generally WORLD BANK AR, supra note 36.
76 Id. at 42-44.
77 Id.
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tally sound, long-term economic growth that supports the indigenous
people.
IV. TOLL OF DEBT SERVICING
Unfortunately, long-term development policies have been the excep-
tion and not the rule for developing countries. Therefore, many of these
countries find themselves in a situation of continually requesting short-
term development loans78 to meet their mounting debt and interest
needs, only to have their total debt obligation rise with the addition of
the new loans.
Most countries take on the proposed short-term development
projects, and their accompanying debt, to try to alleviate some of their
internal economic problems. 79 But they soon find themselves burdened
with the larger problem of paying the interest or installment payments on
the debt that financed the project.80
This, in turn, puts a great deal of pressure on the project to succeed
and continue succeeding. The problem with this pressure is that not all
of the projects are designed to meet the high level of economic return
that is necessary to service the debt.81 Therefore, the countries and their
respective governments end up trying to resolve their internal problems
with new development programs that only increase their total debt obli-
gation. The result is a more stressful economic environment in the bor-
rowing country that eventually takes its toll on the people, the land and
the country.
The toll usually translates into robbing the indigenous people and
the environment to pay the banks. In fact, many developing countries
find themselves in the unfortunate position of "borrowing" from their
forests, soils, wildlife and water supplies to pay their debts.8" Again, this
is a short-term solution, especially for countries merely paying the inter-
est owed on loans, and not principal,83 because these resources need time
to regenerate. Ultimately, because of the long regeneration cycles, 84 con-
sumption will outpace the regeneration ability of these resources, leaving
78 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
79 The internal problems include economic and social problems such as providing food, shelter,
and work for their citizens.
80 Barton, Debt Swaps: New Game in Town, 48 CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS, Mar. 7, 1988, at 62.
This puts an additional external pressure on the country in addition to the internal one they were
trying to alleviate originally.
SI See World Bank Accounting for the Environment, supra note 72 for references to the Trans-
migration project in Indonesia.
82 Dumanski, supra note 55.
83 Barton, supra note 80, at 62-65.
84 The regeneration periods usually last a few decades. N. MYERS, THE PRIMARY SOURCE:
TROPICAL FORESTS AND OUR FUTURE 173 (1984).
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behind environmental chaos and fewer sources for generating future
revenue.
V. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS AS A SOLUTION TO THE DEBT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES
Although debt-for-nature swaps are not the only nor ultimate an-
swer to either the international debt crisis or the global environmental
crisis, they have been established as a vehicle which addresses both
concerns.
The useful purposes of a debt-for-nature proposal include: 1) conser-
vation and sustainable management of a biosphere reserve; 2) debt reduc-
tion for the participating country; and 3) partial satisfaction of
outstanding loans that may remain in the bank's portfolio for an indefi-
nite period of time.
When compared to the debt-equity85 arrangements that have been
used recently in various countries,86 debt-for-nature swaps appear to be a
better solution to the debt problems of these countries. This is evidenced
by the fact that in a debt-equity swap, the participating country basically
ends up "selling" or swapping an equity interest in their country to a
private-outside third party in exchange for money or a debt note. 87
In effect debt-equity arrangements create dissention in the partici-
pating countries because assets are given to the third party who then
owns a piece of the country and may eventually dictate the policy with
regard to that geographical or economic area.8 8 In a debt-equity swap
the focus is on the external control and intervention imposed on these
developing countries by outside organizations.89 This is a necessary im-
position on these countries because under recent debt rescheduling agree-
ments, a debtor nation cannot buy back its own debt at a discounted
rate.90 However, outside or third parties can purchase this discounted
debt. Therefore, the debtor country is put in the position of having to
make political and economic concessions in order to get the discount on
some of the debt they owe or to get the discount when paying off these
85 Debt-equity arrangements involve a foreign investor buying part of a country's debt from a
creditor bank and then reselling the debt to the country owing the debt at its full value. The coun-
tries buying the debt pay the full amount in their own currencies which is usually immediately
reinvested in existing or new ventures in the country. In other words the country ends up giving up
part of its economic control in these situations. Borrelli, supra note 28, at 46-47; Barton, supra note
80, at 62-63.
86 Borrelli, supra note 28, at 46-47; Barton, supra note 80, at 62-63.
87 In 1986 Chile traded a controlling interest in Provida, its largest pension fund manager, and
Corsorcio, its premier life insurer for $43 million in Chilean loans. Barton, supra note 80, at 62.
88 Id. at 62-63.
89 Id. at 65; Borrelli, supra note 28, at 46-47.
90 Barton, supra note 80, at 65.
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debts, if it is possible.9 ' Part of these concessions include making deci-
sions that are not always favorable or in the best interests of the local
people.92
Contrary to some critical opinions,93 debt-for-nature swaps do not
impose the harsh economic or political concessions on the debtor nations
that some debt-equity swaps impose. In a debt-for-nature swap the non-
governmental organization, such as Conservation International, helps
plan and administer the conservation program. Upon completion of sev-
eral conditions, the debt is cancelled. 94 Under the Bolivian deal, the debt
would be cancelled when the following conditions occur: 1) the conserva-
tion reserves totalling over 4 million acres are set aside;95 2) Congres-
sional Law status is conferred on these areas;96 3) a plan to administer
and manage the research and use of the land by local participants is for-
mulated and implemented; 97 and 4) a $250,000 fund, in local currency, is
established to administer the project.98
In fact, Conservation International, the official advisor to the pro-
ject, has set up a local Ministry in conjunction with Bolivian officials and
scientists to administer the plan.99 All conservation efforts will be car-
ried out by Bolivian institutions and local residents with the assistance of
Conservation International."° In addition, this project not only has
political support, as manifested by the active participation of Bolivia's
political leaders in the project,'' but it has the economic support of the.
$250,000 in local funds to manage and protect the biosphere reserve.10 2
Moreover, local residents, during a Congress of Civic Associations, voted
to give seven percent of their tax revenues from forestry activities to sup-
port the biosphere reserve.' 03 Highlighting this demonstration of local
support to the project, Conservation International's President, Peter Se-
91 Id.
92 See generally Dumanski, supra note 55; World Bank Accounting for the Environment, supra
note 72.
93 G.A. POTTER, DIALOGUE ON DEBT: ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES AND SOLUTIONS 75-82
(1988); Barton, supra note 80, at 65.
94 Bramble, Swapping Debts for Nature, 2 INT'L DAMS NEWSLETTER No. 5, at 7 (Sept./Oct.
1987).
95 Id.; CI Press Release, supra note 10, at 1-3.
96 CI Press Release, supra note 10, at 3.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 2.
99 Id. at 3; see also Giaimo, supra note 6, at 566.
100 CI Press Release, supra note 10, at 3.
101 The following Bolivian officials were directly involved in coordinating the project: President
Victor Paz Estenssoro, Ambassador Fernando Illanes de la Riva and the Minister of Agricultural
and Peasant Affairs, Guillermo Justiniano. CI Press Release, supra note 10; CI Embassy Statement,
supra note 30.
102 CI Press Release, supra note 10, at 2; Giaimo, supra note 6, at 566.
103 C1 Presents Award to People of the Beni, IV TRoPICUs 2 (1988) [hereinafter IV TROPICUS].
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ligman, remarked, "[w]hile we are all concerned about protecting the en-
vironment, they have actually done it."'"
Debt-for-nature swaps seem to be a dignified alternative to making
political concessions, such as tax breaks,10 and giving economic conces-
sions by exchanging local assets for debt 06 by the debtor country. These
swaps are even more enticing in that they are generally well supported by
the participating governments10 7 as opposed to debt-equity swaps which
may be only grudgingly supported." 8
The Bolivian debt-for-nature swap is different from a debt-equity
swap due to the fact that the local people support the project in spirit and
practice. Evidence of this local dedication to the project can be seen
through their efforts to make this project a reality by contributing their
skills as workers and their money as taxpayers.'0 9
VI. PROBLEM AREAS IN DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
A. Terms
Debt-for-nature swaps could not be implemented on the large scale
that debt-equity swaps are implemented due to the fact that the banks are
not ready, or willing, to relinquish all of their debt holdings from these
developing countries at such enormous discount rates." 0 This is high-
lighted by the fact that the amount of debt cancelled in the Bolivian debt-
for-nature swap, $650,000"'. of a total debt of $4 billion,"I2 is relatively
small and could be considered insignificant in the overall debt picture.
More importantly, the success of this type of program is contingent
on the banks finding a way to compensate their portfolios for the dis-
counts they allow and losses they take in these arrangements. Some
deals might be facilitated wherein the banks absorb the costs or losses
themselves. 1 3 Or the banks might try to write off the discounted portion
104 Id.
1o5 Barton, supra note 80, at 65; Borrelli, supra note 28, at 46-47.
106 Barton, supra note 80, at 65; Borrelli, supra note 28, at 46-47.
107 Truell, supra note 13; Beebe & Stroh, supra note 6; Allman, supra note 8, at 54.
to8 Barton, supra note 80, at 65; Borrelli, supra note 28, at 46-47.
109 IV TROPICUS, supra note 103.
110 Borrelli, supra note 28, at 46-47. The calculated discount rates for debt-for-nature swaps
already facilitated are: Bolivia-85%, Costa Rica-83%, and Ecuador-67%.
I' Id.
112 Id.
113 Several banks have been involved in debt-for-nature swaps, therefore, not all the discounted
loans are being bought from the same bank. The banks involved include: Citicorp Investment Bank
for the Bolivian deal; Central Bank of Costa Rica for the Costa Rican deal; and several U.S. banks
for the swap in Ecuador. Since the losses have been spread among various banks, the question of
how to cover these losses has not been of primary concern. But as these debt-for-nature swaps
become more popular the recoupment problem must be addressed or the banks will limit their use of
this plan. See Borrelli, supra note 28, at 42-44.
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as a loss. 114 However, most banks are not going to set up wholesale pro-
grams to give away their debt holdings at discount rates without some
way to recoup their losses.
The United States Department of the Treasury, in an interesting
move to prompt U.S. banks to donate their debt holdings to lesser-devel-
oped countries for charitable purposes, has decided to liberally interpret
Revenue Ruling 87-124.115 The Revenue Ruling, which covers both
debt-equity swaps and debt-for-charity swaps, allows a bank that trans-
fers its third world debt to a debtor country to take a full cost basis
deduction in that debt if it is for charitable purposes.1 1 6 A debt-for-na-
ture swap would be considered a debt-for-charity swap because a non-
profit organization receives the debt without consideration and gives it to
the debtor country on a conditional basis.11 7
B. The Agreement
The debt-for-nature swap has been hailed as an innovative alterna-
tive to the current debt relief proposals available to developing coun-
tries.11 ' It is innovative, but is it enforceable?
The agreement itself does not mention the possibility of the project
failing. 9 Failure of the agreement or project could be the result of fac-
tors such as: 1) natural disaster; 20 2) economic disaster, worldwide or
national currency problems, such as inflation or devaluation; 12 1 3)
114 See the current changes in the Treasury Regulations-Fleet Northstar Bank of Rhode Is-
land recently discharged $250,000 of Costa Rican debt as a "normal charge-off to the profit and loss
reserve[s]" of the bank. 39 TAx NoTEs 307, 308 (1988).
115 Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205. Perhaps the tax deductions combined with pressures
from environmental groups, Congress, and the public will be a catalyst for a larger scale debt relief
program. In addition to the favorable Treasury regulations mentioned previously the Members of
Congress have introduced legislation to protect the World's remaining rainforests, see H.R. 3010,
100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H6620 (1987). See also H.R. 1704, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
135 CONG. REc. H960 (1989).
116 Id.
117 See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A-D) (1986). The non-profit organization, such as Conservation In-
ternational, gives or exchanges the debt to a debtor country, such as Bolivia, for a commitment to
establish a conservation and sustainable use area that will be legally protected by the government.
118 See generally Truell, supra note 13; Borrelli, supra note 28; and Allman, supra note 8, at 53-
54.
119 Agreement, supra note 29, at cls. 1-10.7.
120 In the case of a natural environmental disasterforce majeure would be the governing princi-
ple relieving the parties of their duties to the extent that they are impossible to perform. See gener-
ally Litvinoff, Force Majeure, Failure of Cause and Theorie de l'Imprevision, 46 LA. L. REv. 1
(1985).
121 A major economic crisis could force Bolivia to export rainforest lumber despite the environ-
mental agreement or consequences. Development of the Amazon and destruction of the rainforest
may go beyond economic preference and become an undeniable economic necessity. See de Lama,
Brazil Resists Campaign to Save Rain Forests, Chi. Tribune, Mar. 12, 1989, at Cl, col. 1.
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change in political structure; or 4) local undermining if the program is
less than promised or produces too low of a return for the effort put into
the program by the local people. Nor does it include an arbitration,
choice of law, or choice of forum clause in any of its points.1
22
Since these enforcement issues were not incorporated into the agree-
ment it is necessary to examine whether the enforcement issue was over-
looked, intentionally or unintentionally, or summarily rejected as a term
of the agreement by both or one of the parties. In addition, a discussion
of the alternatives for both parties, in the case of a breach or partial repu-
diation of the agreement, will help measure the force or power of the
agreement and its place as a successful debt relief program for developing
countries.
1. Enforcement of the Agreement
There are several reasons which may explain why enforcement lan-
guage was not included in the debt-for-nature swap agreement between
Conservation International and the country of Bolivia. For instance, as
previously stated, the enforcement problem may have been overlooked,
intentionally or unintentionally, or it may have been summarily rejected
after review or consideration by either or both of the parties.
The debt-for-nature swap was a new and speculative idea that in-
volved only a small portion of the total Bolivian debt obligation.' 23
Given the speculative nature of the program and the small amount of the
total debt obligation it represented, Bolivia may not have signed or par-
ticipated in an agreement that would have included stricter enforcement
terms. Their reluctance to accept stricter terms would be based in part
on the risk of not being able to uphold the agreement or being forced to
breach the agreement due to circumstances beyond their control. '24 If
Conservation International had tried to demand strict or explicit enforce-
ment terms, they may have had to forfeit the entire plan. Instead, Con-
servation International used a subtle form of enforcement through the
terms of the agreement which provided for the extensive involvement of
Conservation International in designing and implementing 25 the project.
This may have been the most effective enforcement technique that could
have been utilized by the parties. Direct involvement in the project al-
lows for continual dialogue as the project progresses. Thus, Conserva-
tion International and the Bolivian representatives would be able to
122 Agreement, supra note 29, at cls. 1-10.7.
123 Only $650,000 (US) out of over $4 billion of debt owed by Bolivia. CI Press Release, supra
note 10, at 1; Borrelli, supra note 28, at 42.
124 These circumstances could include social or economic conditions beyond the governments
control, such as force majeure. See supra note 120.
125 Agreement, supra note 29, at cls. 1, 10.4.
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resolve their differences, or potential problems, as they arose and before
they became too large.
Conservation International can, and most likely will, use their pres-
ence as official advisor 126 to the project to set the foundation for a highly
aware and concerned local effort to make this project succeed. Since the
environmental concerns were of paramount importance to Conservation
International, their direct participation in the program was the most ef-
fective way to ensure that this innovative conservation idea would be-
come a reality.
As previously noted, the small amount of debt being exchanged
would not have been enough of an incentive for Bolivia to agree to the
types of restrictions that would ensure enforcement of the agreement.
Thus, Conservation International was probably willing to sacrifice these
terms being spelled out for the sake of advancement toward their goal of
conserving the rainforests. However, Conservation International was
probably aware that the local residents and the government of Bolivia
would probably give deference to Conservation International's sugges-
tions as "experts" 127 on the matter.
Since this is a five year agreement,1 28 renewable upon evaluation by
the parties when it expires, 129 Conservation International may have ac-
cepted these terms with the hope of negotiating a longer agreement with
stronger terms, 130 at the renewal stage.
On the other hand, Conservation International may not have very
much leverage to negotiate for stricter terms if the country is adverse to
the new terms. The notes for the $650,000 debt have already been given
to Bolivia' 3 ' and according to the agreement, they were not conditional
or revocable. ' 32 Therefore, Bolivia has no incentive to enter into stronger
or more stringent agreements regarding the note. Nevertheless, they may
enter into an agreement to continue the conservation and development
126 CI Press Release, supra note 10, at 3.
127 They are primarily involved in environmental projects and will therefore have more infor-
mation to bring to the discussion.
128 Agreement, supra note 29, at cl. 10.6.
129 Id.
130 Based on their time and financial commitment Conservation International would be in a
position to demand these types of terms.
131 CI Press Release, supra note 10.
132 Not one provision in the agreement addresses what will happen to the notes after the agree-
ment expires. See generally Agreement, supra note 29, at cl. 10.7. Clause 10.1 of the agreement calls
for the creation of fund in the amount of $250,000(US) in Bolivian currency. $100,000 of this fund
represents the amount paid for the debt obligation from the Swiss bank. Id. at cl. 10.1. A national
counterpart will contribute the remaining $150,000 to this fund which is to serve as the financial
vehicle of the conservation effort in the Amazon. The creation and utilization of this fund gives a
sense of quasi-permanence to the project due to the fact that the money will be in use for five years
before the agreement expires. Id.
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work that has begun in the Beni Biosphere Reserve, if it proves to be a
mutually beneficial venture.
2. Alternatives Resolutions
Since these enforcement issues were not incorporated into the agree-
ment, the possible alternatives, in case of a breach or partial repudiation,
should be examined. These alternatives include: bringing suit in the
United States; bringing suit in Bolivia; or possibly bringing an action
before the International Court of Justice.
Under U.S. law, the Exceptions of Foreign Sovereign Immunity of a
Foreign State13 3 would protect Bolivia from suit in United States courts
unless it consented to an explicit or implicit waiver of jurisdictional im-
munity. 34 The Bolivian debt-for-nature swap agreement does not con-
tain an explicit, nor an implied, waiver of sovereign immunity. 135
Therefore, Bolivia would not necessarily be subject to a lawsuit in the
United States.
Additionally, the U.S. government would probably decline to act as
a party on behalf of Conservation International in this situation due to
the private nature of the deal and the relatively small amount of debt
forgiven here. 136 Likewise, the United States would be reluctant to be an
active participant in these proceedings due to the fact that critics would
claim the U.S. was condoning payments that they feel should not be re-
paid by the debt ridden countries. 13
7
Moreover, the U.S. government is not equipped or prepared to inter-
vene or take up these actions economically, politically or administra-
tively. The economic interest for the United States is weak because the
banks have already been paid or have taken loss deductions on the
133 Exceptions to Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States and Their Property Under The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 3, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1602-1611 (1989). This Act created
eight exceptions from jurisdiction and three exceptions from attachment and execution. Id. at §§ 3-
13. In a world of increasing contact between foreign states and American parties, the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act was established to distinguish the context under which a lawsuit could be
brought against these foreign entities and when they were immune from suit. H.R. No. 1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
134 28 U.S.C.S. at § 3.
135 Agreement, supra note 29, at cls. 1-10.7.
136 CI Press Release, supra note 10, at 1; Borrelli, supra note 28, at 46.
137 Carol Barton is critical of the debt-for-nature swaps saying, "Our involvement in debt
swaps compromises our efforts and diverts our attention from the real issue - the need for a just
solution to the debt crisis that does not place the burden on the poor, and for new international
arrangements in finance and trade that benefit the nations of the South and allow them to define their
own development." Barton, supra note 80, at 65. Debt-for-nature swaps are designed to sustain the
local populations by giving them direct input in planning and operating the project. CI Press Re-
lease, supra note 10, at 3. Therefore, this criticism seems meritless.
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loans,13 8 therefore, banks will not pressure the U.S. government to act to
uphold the agreement. Politically and administratively, the United
States may not want to create undo tension in the international arena by
attempting to enforce a debt-for-nature swap.
In fact, the only possible alternative would be to exert pressure via
united environmental groups. 139 These groups could be effective because
of their focus: economic interests would be secondary to the environmen-
tal concerns of these organizations. However, using the pressure of envi-
ronmental groups to encourage the United States to act on behalf of
private organizations in this context would probably not produce the de-
sired results. Despite the fact that the United States is concerned with
debt issues-giving and receiving payments for debts-it does not exclu-
sively focus on debt and development projects the way the World Bank
and other MDBs do. Debt issues are not the "raison d'etre" or primary
business of the United States, as they are for international development
institutions. Consequently, there would have to be stronger reasons for
the United States to intervene given the possible political, economic, and
administrative costs.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court would limit the jurisdic-
tion of the United States on claims of this type."4 The Supreme Court
has stated:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be ob-
tained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as
between themselves ....
The acts of Bolivia, whether by their officially designated office at the
biosphere site or another governmental entity, would constitute a govern-
mental action in its own territory. Clause Five of the agreement between
Bolivia and Conservation International designates a national institution
to be named the executive entity of its programs acting in representation
of the country of Bolivia. 14
2
Ultimately, the United States does not have a compelling reason to
represent Conservation International or intervene in this area if a prob-
138 Bramble, supra note 94, at 7.
139 This worked with the World Bank. The World Bank adopted policy changes in 1987 as a
result of pressure from environmental groups, Congress and the Reagan administration. See supra
text accompanying notes 56-65.
140 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
141 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. at 252.
142 Agreement, supra note 29, at cls. 5, 10.1. The national entity designated by the government
of Bolivia to administer the project is the Ministry of Peasant and Agricultural Affairs. Id.
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lem developed. Furthermore, if the United States tried to intervene in
this situation both the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act of State Doctrine seem to limit
the efforts of the U.S. in their attempts to enforce the agreement.
Another alternative for Conservation International would be to
bring suit in a Bolivian court in an attempt to enforce the agreement.
Article 127 of the Bolivian Constitution describes the powers of the Bo-
livian Supreme Court. 143 These powers are very broad. 1  For example,
the Supreme Court has the authority "to decide in sole instance"1 45 mat-
ters concerning: a)"denunciation or complaints against diplomatic and
consular agents"; 46 b)"cases arising out of contracts, negotiations, and
concessions made by the executive power, and of contentious-administra-
tive claims which the decisions thereon may bring about";14 and
c)"suits against the resolutions of the legislative power or of one of its
chambers, whenever such resolutions may affect one or more concrete
rights, either civil or political, and regardless of who the interested par-
ties may be."'' 4
8
These powers are broad enough to allow the Bolivian Supreme
Court to hear an enforcement case brought by Conservation Interna-
tional. 149 However, the Bolivian Supreme Court would probably be in-
clined to follow the governmental policy that was administered, whether
it agreed with it or not. 5 ' It would be very easy for the Court to ration-
alize a governmental action that partially or totally repudiated the agree-
ment. For instance, a national interest in terminating the agreement, or
part of the agreement, could be a very strong consideration."'5 Similarly,
if the government claimed economic or social interests in repudiating the
agreement the Bolivian Supreme Court would be most likely to give def-
erence to the acts as being in the best interest of the country. 52 There-
143 BOL. CONST., supra note 33, art. 127, at 39-40.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at para. 7.
147 Id. at para. 8.
148 Id. at para. 10.
149 Id. at paras. 1-12.
150 This paper does not include independent research on the decisional trends of the Bolivian
Supreme Court. Instead this opinion is based on a comparison of the U.S. court system. The Ameri-
can courts, which have historically been independent, defer to the doctrine of sovereign immunity
when addressing suits against foreign entities. See generally Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. at 250;
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398. Since American courts have a reputation for
being independent, extending this awareness of sovereign immunity to another court system does not
appear to be too far-reaching.
151 National interests may include economic or social conditions that necessitate repudiation of
the agreement.
152 If the project is a fiasco the country must look out for its best interest and make appropriate
decisions concerning its welfare.
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fore, in the domestic Bolivian courts, Conservation.International would
probably be subject to a bias in favor of promoting governmental actions
in the country's best interests and have very little success in an action to
enforce the agreement.
Conservation International could also try to bring an action before
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") to enforce the debt-for-nature
swap agreement. However, in order to bring an action before the ICJ, an
entity must have standing as a state. 153 Conservation International does
not have the required standing to go before the ICJ. 54 Due to their lack
of standing, Conservation International, a U.S. entity, would have to sub-
mit their dispute through U.S. government representation.1 55 As a sover-
eign nation the United States could intervene on behalf of Conservation
International under article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. However, there are two obstacles. First, as previously dis-
cussed, 15 6 there is very little incentive for the United States to intervene
on behalf of Conservation International. Second, the United States has
surrendered its capacity to bring actions before the ICJ as a result of
walking out of proceedings involving an action by Nicaragua against the
United States. 57
VII. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, Conservation International's enforcement alterna-
tives by court action, whether in the United States, Bolivia or before the
ICJ, do not appear to further their goal of enforcing the debt-for-nature
agreement.
If a problem arises, it appears that the decision of the Bolivian gov-
ernment will dictate the result. This includes a range of possible solu-
tions from minor modification to repudiation of the agreement.
Some critics will argue that due to the lack of an effective enforce-
ment mechanism, this program is just another short-term solution to the
environmental and debt crises. Carol Barton of the Center of Concern in
Washington D.C. argues that
participation in debt swaps means participation in the inequitable sys-
tem that created the debt crisis - one where Western banks and gov-
ernments control the resources and set the terms, where nations of the
153 Statute of the International Court of Justice § 34, as amended to January 1, 1977.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 135-137.
157 For a discussion of the United States, Nicaragua and the ICJ see generally Highet, Between
a Rock and a Hard Place-The United States, the International Court, and the Nicaragua Case, 21
INT'L LAW. 1083 (1987); Rowles, Nicaragua v. United States: Issues of Law and Policy, 20 INT'L
LAW. 1245 (1986); Joyner, The ICI Case on the Merits: Legal and Moral Implications of the US. Aid
to the Contras; the Nicaraguan Side, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.J. 41 (1987).
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South cannot get fair prices for their goods, and where Third World
elites are rewarded by the North for pillaging their countries and re-
pressing their people.
158
The problem with this argument is that it is applicable to almost any debt
relief program initiated on behalf of these debt ridden countries. More-
over, it is unfair to condemn these countries'1 5 9 attempts at solving their
financial problems in innovative ways, given the fact that the banks are
not going to endorse outright forgiveness of all the debt that has accumu-
lated.16  Partial forgiveness of the obligations may be on the horizon
161
for these countries, but total forgiveness is very unlikely.
Notwithstanding the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms, a
debt-for-nature swap is not just another short-term solution to these cri-
ses. It is a very effective way to address both the economic and ecological
problems facing these debtor countries. Previously, these countries relied
heavily on outside participation and direction for the implementation of
development programs. 162 They deferred to the advice of international
development institutions in designing and implementing these programs.
But, these programs were not always designed in the best economic or
ecological interests of the participating countries.
63
Debt-for-nature swaps utilize the internal organizations and the lo-
cal peoples of the participating countries to provide a long-term sustaina-
ble use program that will support both the people and the environment.
The intentions of the program are noble, but the fact remains that
the agreements are unenforceable. This issue might be easily overlooked
when the amount of debt forgiven is only $650,000 of a $4 billion debt.
But the figures will rise, and this enforcement void needs to be addressed
before the debt-for-nature swap arrangements become the victim of
abuse.
The most pressing problem is how large the debt forgiveness under
debt-for-nature swaps will become and what enforcement changes will
accompany these agreements? Bolivia has expressed a desire to retire
158 Barton, supra note 80, at 63.
159 Barton, supra note 80, at 62-65. Some may assume that these types of swaps would be more
enticing to the poorer countries but this is not necessarily true because the poorer countries with
higher debt payments are actually more likely to curtail or suspend their debt payments or just cut
down the trees and sell them to make the debt payments. In other words poorer countries have more
bargaining chips and less of an incentive to compromise on a small amount of forgiveness.
160 Banks are more likely to try to negotiate debt-equity arrangements in countries that have
higher return rates per dollar on their debt. Borrelli, supra note 28, at 46-47.
161 Id. at 47-49.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
163 See generally Dumanski, supra note 55; World Bank- Accounting for the Environment, supra
note 72. The Polonoreste Road and Narmada Dam projects are illustrative examples of these prob-
lematic programs.
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over $6 billion (US) of its current debt obligation in this manner."' In
addition, Costa Rica is already whittling away at large amounts of its
debt obligation. 6
Obviously, as the figures rise the organizations facilitating the debt-
for-nature swaps will have to look for a way to enforce these agreements
so that when the debt obligations are paid in full the trees do not start
falling. This will ultimately depend on the participating governments'
dedication to environmental conservation and not the use of the debt-for-
nature swaps as a facade to retire some debt.1 6 6 At this point the organi-
zations facilitating these deals will probably condition the agreements on
a pro rata performance and time scale with revocation or penalties as-
sessed for non-performance. But these enforcement issues cannot cloud
the innovative spirit that inspired this program nor can it deemphasize
the fact that "[w]hile we are all concerned about protecting the environ-
ment, they [Bolivia] have actually done it." '167
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